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The long-term development in productivity in an economy is the main indi-
cator in an assessment of the outlook for economic development. In theory,
countries that lag behind the leading countries in productivity should grad-
ually succeed in closing that gap.
Since the mid-1990s the Federal Republic of Germany has not been able
to continue the process of catching up with the trend in productivity in the
United States that was typical until then. In past decades the development
in Germany compared with the United States was dominated by the process
of introducing best-practice technologies, for example modern information
and communications technologies, but that has evidently faltered now. That
is still the conclusion to be drawn after the introduction of the new methods
of calculating the national accounts, which were expected to reduce the
methodological differences in the assessment of productivity between Ger-
many and the United States. However, the gap in productivity growth
between the two economies may be expected to shrink again in the medium
term, partly because the structural reforms on the labour market and the
investment in modern information and communications technologies made
in the past should have a positive effect.
Productivity growth matters in the long run. As only the wealth created
can be distributed the speed at which the efficiency of an economy is
increasing will mark the limit for this distribution. So without a clear rise in
efficiency the population in a country cannot expect their material prosper-
ity to continue to rise. Owing to this fundamental interrelation determining
the medium to long-term growth rate in productivity, and here especially
the productivity of labour, is of crucial importance.
Since the mid-1990s the typical process of catching up with the develop-
ment in productivity in the United States has been interrupted in Germany.
Until now economists have always assumed that a country with a lower
level of productivity will be able to catch up owing to cost advantages in the
acquisition of more efficient production technologies. By introducing best-
practice technologies _ e.g. modern information and communications tech-
nologies1 _ into their businesses and society countries that lag behind the
leading productivity countries should succeed in gradually closing that gap.
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That process was characteristic of the development in
Germany compared with the United States in past
decades, but it has evidently faltered now. The produc-
tivity gap is growing again. At the same time other
OECD and newly industrialised countries are catching
up with Germany. So Germany is under pressure from
two sides.
The productivity gap that has been opening since
the mid-1990s is putting Germany at a disadvantage in
the international competition for inward investment, as
on liberalized capital markets capital flows to where it
can be used most productively, that is, at the highest
rate of return. With the opening of markets in the newly
industrialised countries, the political change in eastern
Europe since the early 1990s and the resultant growing
integration in the world economy Germany now has to
maintain its position as a location for production in face
of more intensive competition worldwide.2 High labour
productivity is an essential location factor. If there are
insufficient incentives to invest capital in highly produc-
tive jobs in Germany unemployment will rise rapidly
while wages stagnate, as the low level of investment in
the domestic economy makes progress in productivity
relatively modest. Hence a low level of productivity can
easily lead to a low level of growth with rising unem-
ployment.
The separation of short-term fluctuations in produc-
tivity from the medium to long-term trend in Germany
compared with the United States has already been
analyzed in an earlier study.3 However, at that time it
was not possible to use the revised data of the national
accounts for Germany as these were only published by
the Federal Statistical Office in April this year.4 The
introduction of chain indexes5 and hedonic methods6 in
calculating the domestic product involved considerable
methodological changes, and the implications of these
for the determination of the short and medium-term pro-
ductivity trends in Germany and the United States will
be examined in this paper.
Divergent productivity trends 
in the United States and Germany 
since the mid-1990s
In past decades Germany has always shown clearly
higher growth in productivity on average than the
United States. Nevertheless, certain trends are reflected
in both time series. Figure 1 shows the growth rates in
productivity per hour for both economies. After rela-
tively high rates in the 1960s the rise in productivity fell
noticeably in both economies in the 1970s, but it acceler-
ated again in the 1980s. However, since the mid-1990s
the trends have moved further and further apart. While
the rise in productivity accelerated again in the United
States it flattened in Germany.
To establish whether this is due solely to cyclical
phenomena or to a change in the productivity develop-
ment trend a further examination of the trend growth
rates was made using a semi-structural approach.7 This
is based on the fact that procyclical productivity growth
ahead of the cycle is one of the stylized facts of economic
cycle research (on the methods see box).8 This fact was
used to identify the trend component. For the calculation
the average productivity growth was estimated, firstly
as a deterministic model with structural breaks (step
function) and secondly as a stochastic trend model (state
space model).
The results of the deterministic model for Germany
show that the average productivity growth is not con-
stant. The Hansen test shows that there is at least one
structural break in the average growth rate and in its
variance, which is often also described as volatility. The
results of the procedure used by Bai and Perron _ with a
given minimum gap of three years between the break
1  Cf. B. van Ark, J. Melka, N. Mulder, M. Timmer and G. Ypma: 'ICT
Investment and Growth Accounts for the European Union', 1980-2000,
Report for the European Commission, Brussels 2002.
2  Cf. e.g. G. Erber and A. Sayed-Ahmed: 'Offshore Outsourcing: A Glo-
bal Shift in the Present IT Industry', in: Intereconomics, vol. 50,
Issue 2, 2005, pp. 100-112.
3  G. Erber and U. Fritsche: 'Estimating and Forecasting Aggregate
Productivity Growth Trends in the US and Germany'. DIW Discussion
Paper, no. 471, Berlin 2005 (www.diw.de/deutsche/produkte/publika-
tionen/diskussionspapiere/docs/papers/dp471.pdf).
4  Cf. Statistisches Bundesamt: 'Revision der Volkswirtschaftlichen
Gesamtrechnungen (VGR)', 2005 (www.destatis.de/basis/d/vgr/
vgrevision1.pdf).
5  Cf. P.M. von der Lippe: 'Chain Indices: A Study in Price Index The-
ory', in: Statistisches Bundesamt (ed.): Spectrum of Federal Statistics,
vol. 16, Wiesbaden 2001. 
6  Cf. J. Triplett: 'Handbook on Hedonic Indexes and Quality Adjust-
ments in Price Indexes: Special Application to Information Technol-
ogy Products', in: STI-Working Paper, no. 9, OECD, Paris 2004.
7  Cf. R.J. Gordon: 'Exploding Productivity Growth: Context, Causes
and Implications', in: Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 34,
no. 2, 2003, pp. 1-73.
8  This phenomenon has been known for a long time as Verdoorn's or
Kaldor's Law. Cf. J. McCombie, M. Pugho and B. Soro: 'Productivity
Growth and Economic Performance. Essays on Verdoorn's Law', Lon-
don 2002; J. Cornwall: 'Diffusion, Convergence and Kaldor's Law in the
US and the Employment Crisis in Germany', in: H. Hagemann (ed.):
'Growth Theory and Growth Policy', London 2003, pp. 175-186. An
explanation can be found in the literature on real economic cycles, cf.
F.B. Kydland and E.C. Prescott: 'Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctu-
ations', in: Econometrics, vol. 50, 1982, pp. 1345-1370. The theory of
'labour hoarding' combined with slow price adjustments may also
explain the phenomenon, cf. J. Rotenberg and L. Summers: 'Inflexible
Prices and Procyclical Productivity', in: Quarterly Journal of Econom-
ics, vol. 105, 1990, pp. 851-871.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 24/2005  283
points _ show that a model with altogether five breaks
(4th quarter 1966, 4th quarter 1969, 2nd quarter 1979,
4th quarter 1982, 4th quarter 1996) fits best. The results
are shown in figure 2, together with the state space
model _ here the smoothed component of the time-vari-
able coefficient with the 95% confidence interval.
The calculations using both methods show that the
average growth rate with the cyclical influences
excluded has clearly decelerated and remains persis-
tently below the 2% mark.
The results of the deterministic model for the United
States show that constancy in the average productivity
growth need not be rejected. The Hansen test shows that
there is no permanent structural break in the average
growth rate, but there is at least one in the variance.
Using the procedure according to Bai and Perron _ again
with a given minimum gap of three years between the
break points _ it is clear that a model with two breaks
(1st quarter of 1973 and 1st quarter of 1997) fits best.9
The results are shown in figure 3, again together with
the state space model.
The model results show that the productivity trend
in the United States has been fluctuating within a mar-
gin of 2% to 4% a year since the mid-1990s _ as it was
in the 1960s, but that the variance of these fluctuations
has clearly decreased. This is probably due to the fre-
quently discussed reduction in the volatility of the real
growth rates.10
Despite the uncertainties the procedures used to esti-
mate the trends do indicate a clear decelerating of the
development in productivity growth in Germany in the
1990s, while in the United States the trend appears to
have settled on a relatively high level historically since
the mid-1990s.
Productivity growth in Germany after 
the revision of the national accounts
In the past it was argued that part of the differential
between the United States and Germany in the rise in
productivity could be explained by the different extent
to which improvements in quality (hedonics) or other
differences in calculating statistics were taken into
account. After the most recently published revision of
the national accounts for Germany the methodological
9  On the structural break around 1997 cf. B.E. Hansen: 'The New
Econometrics of Structural Change: Dating Changes in U.S. Labor Pro-
ductivity', in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 15, no. 4, 2001, pp.
117-128.
1 Hourly productivity in the whole economy. — 2 Hourly productivity in the non-farm business sector.
Sources: Federal Statistical Office; Bureau of Labor Statistics; DIW Berlin calculations.
Figure 1
Productivity Growth in Germany and the United States
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10  Cf. U. Fritsche and V. Kuzin: 'Declining Output Volatility in Ger-
many: Impulses, Propagation, and the Role of Monetary Policy', in:
Applied Economics (to appear shortly).284 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 24/2005
differences have clearly lessened.11 But is that also hav-
ing an effect on the measurement of growth rates and
their variability?12
For this purpose the change in productivity from the
previous year was calculated for the 'producing sector'
(without construction), 'construction', 'trade, hotels and
catering and transport', 'finance, leasing and corporate
services providers' and for the economy as a whole; the
figures were tested statistically for equality of averages
and distribution. The results are shown in the table.
We see that the equality of the averages on a gener-
ally significant statistical level is accepted. The results
are different for the sub aggregates. For construction
and finance, leasing and corporate services providers
(CSPs for short) there is no equality.
Figure 4 shows that the estimate of the development
in productivity in the 1990s appears to have been
affected by the revision of the national accounts in these
sectors particularly.
The clear differences in construction and CSPs are
not, however, directly related to the problem of chang-
ing to the hedonic method and chain indexes. A different
calculation of the value created using the FISIM
method13 plays a more important part here. Formerly
this was roughly estimated with assumptions of a profit
bonus on the incomes of employees. The current earn-
ings situation of companies operating in Germany is
now taken into account and consequently the level has
risen from the previously published data, as banking
services that were not previously relevant for value cre-
ation are now included in the statistics.
11  Cf. A. Braakmann, N. Hartmann, N. Räth and W. Ströhm: 'Revision
der Volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechnungen 2005 für den Zeitraum
1991 bis 2004', in: Wirtschaft und Statistik, no. 5, 2005, pp. 425-462. 
12  As US data according to the 'old' method (i.e. the method used in
Germany until recently) is not available the comparison can only be
made for Germany.
Measuring the productivity trend growth
For this study long time series on hourly productivity were
needed. Ideally the data should be for the business sector,
and this is available for the United States - 'non-farm busi-
ness sector' figures. For Germany hourly productivity in
the economy as a whole was used – calculated by DIW
Berlin. They are available back to 1960.
The model for both the structural break tests and the state
space model is based on Gordon's approach.1 This
makes it possible that the growth rate is separated into a
trend component (using either a deterministic or a sto-
chastic model) and a cyclical component. The cyclical
component is determined by regressing the growth rate of
hourly productivity to future values of changes in the out-
put gap and filtered out. In order to be able to calculate the
regression up to the present the gross domestic product
was forecasted using an ARIMA (4, 1, 0) process and the
production gap was calculated using a Hodrick-Prescott
filter (λ = 1600).
The structural break tests were carried out in two stages.
First the cyclical influence was filtered out and later the
correspondingly adjusted increase in productivity was
regressed to a constant. The Hansen test is based on the
null hypothesis that there is not a single permanent struc-
tural break in the time series.2 Rejection of the null hypoth-
esis indicates at least one permanent structural break.
The Bai and Perron procedure simultaneously tests for the
presence of several structural breaks and – with a given
minimum distance on the gap between the breaks – calcu-
lates the best fitting break points (the least squares
method).3 The 'optimal' model of those that are available
is chosen with the minimum information criteria (here the
Schwarz information criterion).
As an alternative to the structural break tests another
approach was used that implies steady and smooth fitting.
A state space model with a time-variable coefficient for the
trend growth rate was estimated.4 The model consists of
two equations, the observation equation, which is the
'observable' part of the model, and a state equation. The
observation equation corresponds to Gordon's model
mentioned above, in which productivity growth is divided
into a trend component and a cyclical component. The
trend component is modelled here through the state equa-
tion as a non-stationary stochastic process, unlike the
step function that results from the structural break tests.
That give a high degree of flexibility with regard to adjust
the note to the data. The two equations are estimated
simultaneously, together with the variance of each of the
processes.
1  Cf. R. Gordon, loc. cit.
2  Cf. B.E. Hansen: 'Testing for Parameter Instability in Linear Models',
in: Journal of Policy Modelling, vol. 14, 1992, pp. 517-533.
3  Cf. J. Bai and P. Perron: 'Computation and Analysis of Multiple Struc-
tural Change Models', in: Journal of Applied Econometrics, vol. 18,
no. 1, 2003, pp. 1-22.
4  Cf. J.D. Hamilton: 'Time Series Analysis', Princeton 1994.
Box
13  FISIM, Financial Intermediation Services Indirectly Measured, is
the model calculation of the indirect earnings from their lending and
deposit business which the banks achieve in addition to their direct
turnover, e.g. fees for handling accounts and for safe deposits. Cf.
Statistisches Bundesamt: www.destatis.de/basis/d/vgr/vgrfaq_16.pdf.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 24/2005  285
At the same time the entire pattern of the rise in pro-
ductivity over the period from the start of the 1990s to
the current study has clearly changed. While the pattern
for construction has essentially only been modified since
the mid-1990s by a shift in the level caused by the revi-
sion, it is evident that for CSPs the fall was much more
marked than before, especially from the mid-1990s to
the end of the speculative bubble in the IT sector; after
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics; DIW Berlin calculations.
Figure 2
Productivity Growth and Trend Calculations for the USA using Different Models
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Trend using a stochastic model
Confidence bands in the stochastic model
Sources: Federal Statistical Office; DIW Berlin calculations.
Figure 3
Productivity Growth and Trend Calculations for Germany using Different Models
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that productivity could be stabilized on a lower level.
According to the data before the revision of the national
accounts, on the other hand, the flattening of the produc-
tivity trend also continued in the first half of the current
decade.
All in all it can be stated that the estimate of the
growth in productivity has hardly changed for several
economic sectors after the revision of the national
accounts. It remains an open question whether increas-
ing use of hedonic price adjustment beyond the IT
goods sector, which is more advanced in the United
States, would cause major corrections here.
Conclusion
The calculations on productivity trends presented here
show that the divergence that has persisted since the
mid-1990s between the United States and Germany still
exists.
A relative weakness in innovation in Germany in the
1990s may have contributed to this. However, current
analyses of Germany's technological efficiency14 and the
German Government's Research Report show that there
has been a certain change in the trend in recent years. So
if one assumes a delay of several years before the posi-
tive effects of an increase in innovation are also reflected
on the market in increasing productivity in the economy
there could certainly be a change in the trend in the
course of this decade.
Similarly, the structural reforms on the labour mar-
ket and the investment in modern information and com-
munications technologies made in the past require com-
plementary changes in companies' organization; this
includes restructuring of the value creation chains in the
course of global is at ion.
All these structural adjustments can actually cause
labour productivity to fall temporarily, until the new
production technologies and product innovations domi-
nate the production figures. As long as structural fac-
tors continue to weigh on a considerable part of the
overall result they will conceal the success of the
14  Cf. BMBF: 'Zur technologischen Leistungsfähigkeit Deutschlands
2005', Berlin 2005.
Table














Total 0.98 0.33 1.26 0.41
Producing sector 
(without construction) 0.77 0.38 1.01 0.98
Construction 1.39 0.24 1.67 0.07
Trade, hotels and 
catering, transport 2.12 0.15 1.36 0.27
Finance, leasing, corpo-
rate services providers 0.02 0.90 1.68 0.07
1 The likelihood of errors in rejecting the null hypothesis is given.
Source: DIW Berlin calculations
Figure 4
Hourly Productivity1 in Selected Sectors
In euros
1 Gross value creation (chained volumes, reference year 2000), or gross value cre-
ation in 1995 prices per hour worked.
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restructuring process in the German economy that is
becoming evident in the long term.
The hypothesis put forward during the discussion
over the persistent divergence of the productivity trends
in the United States and Germany, namely that the dif-
ferences observed are mainly due to the use of different
statistical methods to calculate the domestic product
and for price adjustment in the two countries, has not so
far been confirmed now that the calculation methods
used in Germany have come closer to those common in
the United States.
The argument that these differences are only a sta-
tistical artefact and that they distort reality is not sup-
ported by the latest results from the national accounts.
Hence, the revision of the national accounts has not
changed the view of the productivity gap between the
United States and Germany. The gap is currently widen-
ing further.